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The Intellectual Economy of an Anthropology of Change 
 
David Crawford 
DCrawford@anth.ucsb.edu 
 
 
Abstract:   This paper argues that the shifting boundaries of social science, 
and particularly the rise of various forms of “studies,” offer opportunities for 
anthropologists.  Publishing outside of our home discipline demands a 
productive rethinking of our assumptions and purposes, and can help us bring 
our insights to a wider audience.  This is good for our careers, perhaps, but 
also for the people with whom we work, people whose stories deserve to be 
told.  The second part of the paper is an extended version of one attempt to 
write outside of anthropology, to present an anthropological case study as 
relevant to broader political concerns. 
 
 
 
To begin I would like to raise the question of the relationship between the changing 
nature of anthropology as a discipline and the movement, reflected in the title of this 
collection, to develop an “anthropology of change.”  The first part of this equation has 
received much (agonized) attention.  How anthropology, as a division of the intellectual 
universe and a domain of academic practice, is changing or ought to change, is a favorite 
topic of anthropologists themselves, and I am not able to offer much to the debate here.  My 
point will be simply that at least some of the shifting boundaries in the social sciences offer 
opportunities for younger anthropologists, and that change is not necessarily something to 
fear.  In any case, whatever we think of how anthropology ought to change, the academic 
world is changing.  I think that our sanctioned postgraduate training tends to focus a bit too 
exclusively on how things should be in anthropology and not how they are.  This is true for 
everything from the structure of the job market to the divergent demands of the different 
anthropological journals.   
The second part of my question also has a long history.  While it is the case that much 
of the anthropology produced this century can be portrayed as ahistorical or homeostatic, this 
has not necessarily been for lack of trying to portray things more dynamically.  Attempting to 
fit fluid, multivalent social processes into the rigid, sequential form of text is a necessarily 
violent process.  It requires the amputation of the vast majority of ontological reality in order 
to illuminate the particular bit that is of interest to us.  We try to put the whole back together 
again, but we are saddled with the fundamental disjuncture between reality and portrayals of 
it.  Clearly, representational issues are hardly our only problem, but they are a significant one.  
It may be that there are even more fundamental problems with how we think, that we are 
using the wrong metaphors or theoretical tools in the first place and that these lead us into the 
representational crisis so much remarked in these last two decades. 
For the purposes of discussion I have attached a short article that might be considered 
one version of “an anthropology of change.”  I do not believe it is a particularly noteworthy 
example of such an anthropology, and it is certainly not a “pure” one.  Why I think this, why 
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I wrote it anyway, and what I think we should be writing are the subject of a few preliminary 
remarks.    
Changing Anthropology 
The essay appended below is mundanely anthropological in inspiration.  It concerns 
an out-of-the-way place –highland Morocco—and the way that migration, state education and 
development are influencing linguistic consciousness there.  It is based on what we in the 
guild call “long term fieldwork” and “participant observation” and it employs the hackneyed 
theme of “natives under threat.”  This is anything but unusual.  It was written, however, not 
for anthropologists, but for an area studies journal normally read by journalists, political 
scientists, activists and policy makers.  If I would not have included it here it is unlikely that 
any anthropologist would ever have seen it.  Some will maintain that this would have been a 
good thing, and I admit that publication involved some serious compromise.  The journal that 
solicited this piece is suspicious of anthropology.  In editorial meetings and personal asides 
they heap scorn on our terminology, the seemingly esoteric nature of our aims, and our 
generally apolitical presentation.  They told me rather plainly they wanted something jargon 
free, broadly relevant, and politically focused.  I was thus required to write differently than I 
would have for an anthropological journal and this caused me to reflect on the state of my 
natal discipline and the practice of publication.  In one sense the article below represents 
somewhat of a trend in anthropology: the tendency to look “outside” for inspiration, or at 
least an audience.   
The nearby anthropological “outside” consists of many things, but notably today a 
constellation of “studies”: gender and feminist studies, ethnic studies, environmental studies, 
global studies, development studies, area studies, culture studies, religious studies and so 
forth.  Anthropologists generally have as little respect for these sorts of things as my editors 
had for anthropology.  The emergence of these upstarts has been much lamented, at least by 
some anthropologists who fear they will purloin our method and reduce us to apologizing for 
our colonialist ancestors.  In times of financial belt-tightening there may be good reasons 
anthropologists fear a drain on our institutional resources.  On the other hand, it seems to me 
that these new intellectual arenas provide opportunities as much as competition.  At least they 
provide opportunities for different sorts of writing.  Few “disciplines” followed by the word 
“studies” have been around long enough to have become too rigid or too picky, and thus 
remarks can often be made within their spheres “from an anthropological perspective.”  
Admittedly it’s unclear what an “anthropological perspective” might be, but this only makes 
claiming to speak from one easier, and the opportunities for developing one wider.  Without 
making too much of this, I want only to assert that the quasi-disciplines hovering on the edge 
of anthropology provide an important resource, especially for young anthropologists, even 
those who have not completed a Ph.D..  This is so because anthropology has a long, complex 
institutional history and so many practitioners and viewpoints that it can be daunting to find 
something to say that will be seen as interesting or novel.  We have to contend with inertia, 
the weight of history.  The exception to this is the novelty of writing about someplace nobody 
else has been, which is our oldest, but ever more difficult trick.  In a room full of 
anthropologists somebody has likely been nearly everywhere.  Moreover, as the exotic 
becomes politically suspect, even that ruse is becoming closed to us. 
Publishing in the “studies,” however, is comparatively easy for anthropologists, 
depending on what kind you are.  If you happen to be an exoticist, for instance, and have 
been someplace non-anthropologists normally do not go, and if you have even a smattering of 
theoretical knowledge to make sense of what happened there, chances are you have 
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something interesting to say.  Observations that would be gleefully disarticulated in the 
intellectual abattoir of LSE’s Friday Seminar can be published outside the discipline and 
might even be considered quite clever.  I am not saying we should avoid engaging with our 
own colleagues.  I am saying that an anthropology of change must necessarily cast its net 
more widely.  This is easier than we might think.   
I am also not saying that people in other disciplines are stupid.  My point is only that 
due to the increasing fragmentation and specialization of all the social science disciplines 
what may seem a routine observation within one circle might be useful to someone playing a 
different intellectual game.  In a sense people who have been to a traditional “field site” have 
a veritable obligation to publish what they know.  If you’ve been somewhere odd, especially 
somewhere very poor and perhaps illiterate, you have duty to pay back your research funding 
by making the concerns of that place known to the world.  Surely anthropologists already 
know that brutally impoverished people well off the information superhighway still comprise 
the overwhelming majority of the planet’s population, and they may be tired of hearing about 
it.  People outside of anthropology seem to forget this fact, however, and they deserve to be 
reminded.  Moreover, and more cynically, in the US at least publishing is critical to landing 
any type of academic job.  Simple “reporting” from the vibrant human world outside of the 
etiolated mindset of academia is a useful way to build a publishing record –without exposing 
yourself to the discouraging sighs of disciplinary Brahmans.  Rather straightforward 
ethnographic reports used to comprise a great deal of what got published under the banner of 
anthropology.  This is no longer true.  It seems to me that one way anthropology must change 
to incorporate an anthropology of change is to get more voices heard more often, and in less 
pretentious language.  This can be eased, ironically, by moving outside of the traditional 
disciplinary boundaries.  
Anthropology of Change 
That said, there is the more vexing issue of what exactly an anthropology of change 
should be.  As noted above I do not think I have provided a very good example below, which 
would seem to vitiate the claim that circumventing anthropology is the way to grapple with 
the issue.  In the article I rely on the easy trope of “traditional natives battered by change 
from outside.”  I make some noises about the long-term dynamism of the society in question, 
but the overall impression is the confrontation of tradition and modernity.  I acceded to this 
because of a limitation of space and the desire to grab the attention of people who may have 
power over the “outside” processes that are indeed impacting the people whom I write about.  
The choice was strategic rather than academic.  I might have emphasized the more durable 
processes involved, and the inherent dynamism and diversity within culture, but these are not 
easy to outline, and are not primarily the ones over which my audience was likely to exert 
direct control.  I wanted to provoke my readers, at least some of whom may stand to 
influence the processes I describe.  Thus I settled on a particular narrative strategy.  The 
division of outside and inside, like the division between tradition and modernity, can be a 
politically useful heuristic convention.  It can also be a serious impediment to understanding. 
As an anthropologist the things I think really matter to understanding people are 
nearly always dynamic, and this is why I am interested in the anthropology of change.  It is a 
rather obvious, if oft ignored, fact that however we define culture and society they are things 
that have to be reproduced.  In order to endure long enough to be noticed all symbolic orders, 
productive relationships, and institutional arrangements must attend to the fact that the people 
who build and embody such phenomena eventually die.  These unfortunates must be replaced 
by new people, and new people never come ready made.  They have to be built.  The 
 4 
mortality of bodies and minds is the motor that drives social process and positively requires 
the socialization of human beings.  Thus, it seems to me, understanding any change to a 
“tradition” has to engage the question of how very intimate biological, social and cultural 
processes articulate, how, in other words, the “tradition” managed to be resurrected reliably 
enough that it appeared to be a stable entity in the first place.  It is an accident of 
methodology that anthropology has too often been freighted by an emphasis on stability and 
order or the short-term disruption of them.  The temporal constraints of the anthropologist 
bear on the portrayal of the social order, rendering it static when compared, for instance, to 
the perspective of the historian.  Biology might not be the only reason culture is dynamic, but 
it is enough of a reason. 
If an anthropology of change has to contend with the inherent dynamism of culture, it 
also has to deal with the inherent diversity, and the asymmetrical power relations within this 
diversity.  The interpretive turn (as we call it in the US) has done much to render “culture” 
the final unit of analysis and the sine qua non of the discipline, at least on our side of the 
water.  We can’t blame Geertz for geist, obviously, but it’s clear enough that selective and 
fawning readings of him have doomed many descriptions meant to be “thick” to end up 
involuted.  The introduction to Geertz’s manifesto, The Interpretation of Cultures–which 
deals with Berber, Jewish and French misunderstandings of a sheep heist—has been ignored 
in favor of “The Balinese Cockfight.”  The latter, an elegant, transcendentally meaningful 
rendering of a cockfight, had the unfortunate side effect of blinding a generation of students 
to the fact that more than half the people in Bali have no cocks, and that those who do have 
them had to get them from somewhere.   
I am not trying to be peevish.  Geertz himself is too smart to wholly ignore power or 
diversity, as he shows in many places.  This is notable in the aforementioned introduction 
where he deals with the significance of a political event and at least three separable 
perspectives on it.  Still, despite febrile protestation and poststructuralist deconstruction, 
much anthropology continues in the blithe acceptance that in each particular case something 
called a culture exists and is worthy of interpretation.  This is part of a broader problem with 
hermeneutic approaches to cultural phenomena.  If culture is viewed as text, this implies that 
it’s already written, and for the metaphor to hold, we suspect that a single pen was behind the 
production.  This makes grappling with change awkward, necessarily evoking emendations, 
palimpsests, forces and authors outside the “traditional” original document.1  It is probably 
not surprising that anthropologists, as writers plagued by publishers, took to this textual 
metaphor like ducks to water.  The problem is that text, like all metaphors and especially 
metaphors for the intangible phenomena, shapes our thinking as we use them. 
Change, if we accept that it necessarily comes at least partially from within culture 
and society itself, is tied to the differences between people, to their essential 
incommensurability and their ineluctable mortality.  Not just any body will do to fill a social 
vacancy, and not any body can produce a living being.  Bodies (and minds) have to be grown, 
disciplined and classified, and continually reclassified as they grow and change in different 
situations.  They must be the right sex or age to perform their social work, they must be 
associated with certain properties or born into a certain family or lineage or within a certain 
territory.  The list of dynamics is endless.  We cannot develop an anthropology of change 
without attending to the inherent dynamism of, and diversity within, both society and culture.  
 In the following article I try to inject a taste of the problems this suggests in 5,000 
jargon-free words digestible to someone likely to read the Middle East Report in Summer 
2001.  As I said already, I foreground the new and dramatic ways the society is impacted by 
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the state and the larger economy.  I focus strategically (with apologies to my anthropological 
colleagues) on the parts of social interaction influenced by my audience of development 
workers and activists, left-wing academics, journalists and government officials.  My 
intention in dragging this compromise before an audience of anthropologists is to elicit ideas 
about what constitutes “an anthropology of change” and ask how we might use our changing 
intellectual economy to accommodate this. 
How “Berber” Matters in the Middle of Nowhere2 
 
In the rugged mountains south of Marrakech the lives of Berber-speaking farmers 
move in what seems a timeless rhythm.  Men manipulate intricate stone canals, drawing 
water to small terraced plots of barley and maize.  Women in bangles and bright scarves lash 
huge loads of wood to their backs and pick their way down precarious trails.  Fires from 
family bread ovens send thin tendrils of smoke into the sky; cows low, hungry in their pens.  
Young boys throw rocks and lazily tend goats; girls sing as they gather water or fodder or 
wash clothes in the river, their younger siblings strapped to them.  The people of the 
mountains seem to live in another Morocco entirely, one absent the car exhaust and noise of 
urban life, or for that matter even electricity.  The Arcadian surface of village life obscures 
much, however, both enduring facts like the brutality of physical labor and new 
developments, a veritable landslide of social, political and economic changes.  These changes 
are related –but not reducible—to changes occurring elsewhere in Morocco and the world: 
processes of migration, formal education, and what is often called “development.”  Bearing 
on these changes is another fact that is central to much of rural Morocco: the people here do 
not speak Arabic, the national language.   
The linguistic distinctiveness of rural Berbers is not often thought to have much 
relevance in Morocco, and it’s true that it may be overstated.  But to assert that speaking 
Berber somehow and sometimes matters is not to say that Moroccan national politics and 
identity are insignificant, that class and gender are unimportant, that Islam is not central to 
people’s lives, or that the monarchy is distant and meaningless.  All of these things have their 
own significance in the everyday lives of mountain people.  But in reacting against a colonial 
French fascination with the cultural distinctiveness of Berbers, nationalist and anti-colonialist 
scholars and writers have gone to the opposite extreme.  They have ceased treating the 
distinctive language of the estimated 40% of Moroccans who are Berber speakers as having 
any relevance at all.  Urban Imazighen activists (“Imazighen” being the word for what 
English speakers know as “Berbers”) have been fighting against this, arguing that the Berber 
language (Tamazight) deserves a more prominent place in Moroccan history and some 
consideration in educational policy and practice.  Occasionally activists overstate their case, 
making far-flung claims of Berber unity or lapsing back into colonial era rhetoric of a kind of 
cultural “Berberstan” wholly apart from the larger Arabic speaking society.  Rarely does 
anyone have anything dispassionate or specific to say about how Tamazight language use 
matters in contemporary social and political processes. 
Today it seems fair to assert that the significance of “Berberness” lies somewhere 
between the all-encompassing and the nonexistent.  Berber language –or in the instance I 
examine here, the variety of it known as Tashelhit—matters in some ways to most everybody 
who speaks it, and sometimes it matters in ways might be considered political.  I would not 
claim the sort of importance I will outline here for all Berber varieties at all times and places, 
but I will make the case for it in one place at a particular time.  The place is the Agoundis 
Valley, an out of the way nook of the world less than 100 km south of Marrakech.  It sits at 
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5000 feet above sea level in a steep and forbidding canyon, but is well watered by snowmelt 
spilling off the great Ouanoukrim Massif around Jebel Toubkal, the highest mountain in 
North Africa.  The time I focus upon is the late 1990s.  There is no cultural activism or 
fundamentalist Islam.  The people concern themselves mostly with the complicated task of 
growing enough barley and maize to keep themselves alive, with tending goats and cows, and 
with harvesting the almonds and walnuts that are their main source of income.  The way that 
Berber language operates politically in the Agoundis may be idiosyncratic in some ways, but 
it cannot be entirely so.  The Berber speaking regions of all of North Africa are experiencing 
many of the same changes as the Agoundis, and the associated relevance of language seems 
likely to bear comparison.  
I visited the Agoundis Valley as a tourist in 1994 and was impressed mostly with the 
hospitality of the people and the verdant, seemly sustainable agricultural system.  It was a 
drought year and most of the country was scorched to a dusty, dun colored haze.  The cities 
were filling with farmers driven off the land.  Tangiers was rationing water that could only be 
delivered by tanker, and the air conditioners of Rabat were working overtime.  The Agoundis, 
however, was green and cool with the shade of massive walnut trees and flowering 
pomegranates.  It seemed the very model of a contemporary, poor but vital subsistence 
economy.   
In 1998 I returned to the valley to do research in a particular village, Tagharghist.  
Despite being unpracticed as a researcher, it did not take me too long to realize life was not 
percolating along in the homeostasis I had imagined.  In the short time since my previous 
visit the people of the Agoundis had built themselves a road that allowed trucks to access the 
valley, at least on market day.  The village of Tagharghist had garnered itself a Peace Corps 
worker, the first one in the area.  With his help the villagers were busily constructing a 
potable water system.  Also, after the men of the village chiseled a flat spot out of the 
mountainside with sledgehammers and iron bars, the Moroccan government came in and 
began the process of building a school, the first ever.   
Thus after only a four-year absence I found that while men still followed mules back 
and forth through ancient fields, trucks now carried other men to and from jobs outside the 
valley.  Boys still herded goats and girls hauled fodder and firewood, but their younger 
siblings could be heard counting in Arabic in the bright pink schoolhouse.  Women still 
baked tanoort and men made tea for any visitor willing to sit long enough for water to boil, 
but national and international agencies had representatives swarming through the valley, 
dining on the bread and tea, asking questions, making promises.  The people of these 
mountains have long interacted with the Arabic speakers of the plains, but now the outside 
seemed to be arriving more suddenly with more force than ever before.  The outsiders spoke 
Arabic generally, but also English, German and French.  Through processes of migration, 
education and development the plain, often invisible fact of speaking Berber was coming to 
matter in new ways. 
Migration 
Migration is perhaps the most salient social and political force in North Africa today.  
Much has been written about the bidonvilles of Casablanca, the agricultural labor force in 
Spain, the “Arab” quarters of Paris.  What has been less often discussed is the effect 
migration has on the places that send the migrants, the “homes” that these traveling workers 
are so often working to support.  The village of Tagharghist has been involved in these kinds 
of movements for nearly eight hundred years, and maybe many more.  Of the three main 
families in the village, two are said to have originally been Berber-speaking groups from 
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south and east of the mountains.  The third family is thought to have descended from Arabic 
speakers originating in the region between Marrakech and Casablanca.  All three families 
claim to have come to these mountains in the 12th century, following Ibn Tumart, the spiritual 
founder of the Almohad Empire, the second Berber dynasty to rule North Africa and Spain.  
At this time these mountains were not the “periphery” they seem to be today, but were very 
nearly the political heart of all North Africa.  Given this history there is nothing particularly 
new about travel and Berbers in this region, and not even anything particularly new about 
Berbers coming to speak Arabic or Arabs coming to speak Berber.  What has changed 
recently is the scale and form of migration, and thus the way language plays into the process. 
For instance, the road built by the villagers allows men to come and go more easily in 
motorized transportation and the cash economy gives them a reason to do so.  Landless men 
can now maintain households in the village and “commute” for a few weeks or a few months 
to jobs in mines nearby or to commercial agricultural areas further away in the plains.  
Because they are landless, normally these men would not figure prominently in village 
politics, but now that some of them now have money they can “buy” influence in local 
affairs.  The “traditional” system of dividing rights and responsibilities by lineage and land-
owning households has to be adjusted for the more diverse economic base.  If in the past 
subsections of the village had to provide labor for communal projects, now some men can 
pay “fines” to be exempt from these responsibilities.  As such, they can remain “inside” the 
village social and political system precisely because they have paying work “outside” of it.  
Also, for men who send their sons and daughters to work outside the village, the road makes 
it far easier to insure that remittances make it all the way back to the mountains.  Boys 
working in dairy farms as far away as the Middle Atlas and girls working as nannies in 
Marrakech can expect their fathers to arrive on payday to collect the wages, leave a small 
allowance, and return to the village.  Improvements in infrastructure accelerate the pace and 
range that people can move; the globalization of the Moroccan economy generates increasing 
work for those willing to do it cheapest.  Together these changes bring the poor people of the 
mountains into wider contact with the languages and cultural practices of different parts of 
the country. 
All this movement inevitably affects the way language is used and the way different 
languages are understood to matter.  People who have spent any time in the city know well 
enough that tafransist, French, is the language of the educated and the hip, at least in its 
Arabized Moroccan form.  Migrants also come to see that there are several equally “Arab” 
alternatives to Derija, the colloquial Arabic of the Moroccan cities, including the Egyptian 
version so often seen on television and the Modern Standard Arabic of news broadcasts and 
formal speeches.  Migrants who encounter Berber speakers from other regions come to see 
their Tashelhit as but one variety of Tamazight (Berber) and are far more likely to say that 
they can understand other dialects.  For example, Agoundis villagers who haven’t traveled 
tend to define Tarifit (the dialect spoken in the northern Rif Mountains) as “the language of 
the north,” and feel it bears no relation to Tashelhit.  People with more experience moving 
around Morocco more correctly identify Tarifit and Tashelhit as varieties of Tamazight, the 
broadly conceived indigenous language of the country before the Arab invasions. 
Travelers bring these understandings with them back to the village, on summer 
vacations, at the ‘Aid al-Adha, or during Ramadan.  They bring bits of these other languages 
with them and valuations about what they mean.  Linguistic consciousness is thus increasing 
and speaking Tashelhit has for some become an act of homecoming, an assertion of a local 
identity in an increasingly de-localized world.  Where languages and dialects mix, the 
meaning of what is said becomes intimately bound to the language in which it is uttered.  
 8 
This process is only beginning in the Agoundis, but it is sure to continue.  In the Moroccan 
south every person I ever met who felt passionately that speaking Berber mattered was a 
person who had spent time in places where Berber speakers were a minority.  Increasing 
migration thus seems likely to increase a sort of Berber consciousness and with it the political 
potential of the Amazigh, or Berber culture, movement. 
Education 
The people of Tagharghist value education and worked hard to get a government 
school to augment the “traditional” education the children receive at the mosque.  The men 
toiled for weeks in the hot sun, hacking at the boulders next to the road to create a flat 
platform on which a proper building could be constructed.  Eventually the government 
workers appeared with cement and rebar.  Up went the schoolhouse, with a toilet (only the 
second in the village), glass windows, desks, blackboards, and a coat of shocking pink paint.  
The villagers were exuberant and became more so when the matriculating class received their 
Government Issue backpacks filled with school supplies.  Every child lucky enough to get 
one would not take it off, and for weeks they pranced around the village waiting for the first 
day of school.  No rock or wall was safe from the newly acquired chalk and even I was 
pressed to do short arithmetic lessons in Tashelhit to mollify the students awaiting the arrival 
of the teacher. 
In the past the children have only been educated in the mosque, where they focused 
on religion and some rudimentary math.  This is seen as important work and the fqih or 
religious instructor is highly valued by the community.  As in other villages in the valley, the 
people of Tagharghist pay him a hefty supplement of wool, grain and sundry other items to 
augment his government salary.   However valuable religious education might be, it is not by 
itself seen as adequately preparing children for life in contemporary Morocco.  With 
immunizations helping more children than ever to survive childhood, and with the 
government requiring ever more literacy to function as a Moroccan citizen, it is clear to 
everybody that more a formalized, urban or “modern” style of education is needed.  Parents 
know that there will not be enough land to feed the next generation.  To marry and start 
families of their own children will have to move to the city.  Life in the city requires a sort of 
training not available in the mosque. 
Finally the government schoolteacher arrived.  She was pious, wearing her scarf tight 
around her head at all times, and monolingual, an Arabic speaker from Casablanca.  Her 
initial attempts to conduct class were hampered by an absolute inability of most of the 
students to understand anything she said.  One girl who had lived part of her life in 
Marrakech did some translating, but there were many beatings administered to children who 
had a difficult time comprehending what they were supposed to be doing.  Making things 
more difficult was the fact that the teacher had been trained to teach urban students, and the 
materials were designed to facilitate that.  The books, for instance, not only were entirely in 
Arabic, but they relied on pictures of things that were not familiar to rural children.  The 
students were supposed to be learning how to write in the Arabic script, but the examples 
were for things like crosswalks and refrigerators, streetlights and modern ovens.  Enthusiasm 
for school quickly faded and beatings were administered for absenteeism and tardiness.  The 
teacher too became frustrated.  The school day was often shortened and sometimes eliminated 
entirely.  Vacations were extended.  Written school reports went home to parents who 
couldn’t read them and anxious mothers asked me to explain what the various checks in the 
various boxes might mean.  The teacher asked for a transfer, as most do who are assigned to 
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desperately poor rural areas.  The students were released for the summer to await the new 
rookie teacher they would get the next year. 
The impact of school was not restricted to the young children who endured it.  For 
instance, despite the ambivalence most people seemed to feel towards the aloof, Arabic 
speaking schoolteacher, within days of her arrival the teenaged girls began to wear their 
scarves in her style.  To them the teacher was a woman who had made her own way in the 
world, the only woman they had ever seen who did not have to haul impossibly heavy loads 
up and down the steep paths, who could buy her own clothes rather than giving money to a 
man to purchase them at souk, who could travel by herself.  The teacher might be haughty, 
but men showed her respect, at least to her face.  It was hard to parse whether it was her 
urbanity or her strident piousness, her government position or her lifestyle that they wanted to 
emulate.  But her language was Arabic and none of the girls failed to notice that.  The teacher 
made no attempt to speak Tashelhit and nobody seemed to expect that she should, despite the 
fact that the Peace Corps volunteer and myself had both managed to acquire at least enough 
to have reasonable conversations.  For the schoolteacher Tashelhit was beneath consideration, 
something completely unworthy.  The schoolteacher considered her own dialect of Arabic to 
be the closest possible to the language of the Qur’an, and thus very nearly God’s language.  
She told people this.  Tashelhit was a language scarcely better than the babble of children.  
To the dismay of at least some of the older women, teenaged girls could soon be heard 
addressing one another in simple Arabic, despite the fact they had no formal training in it. 
Many Berber and especially Tashelhit students move through the traditional (mosque 
based) educational system to become religious teachers.  The religious universities in 
Morocco are full of Berbers.  All of the teachers in the mosques of the Agoundis speak 
Tashelhit as their first language; many are from this or nearby valleys.  By contrast, none of 
the teachers in the modern government schools admit to knowing Tashelhit, although a few 
say that their mothers spoke it.  This seems significant in that the most radical activists for 
Berber rights that I met were in areas that had had modern government schools far longer 
than the Agoundis.  These activists often describe ill treatment and discrimination in schools 
as factors that lead them to a more politicized Berber consciousness.  I never met a teacher in 
a mosque who thought that children should only know Berber, that Arabic was not very 
important, or that Berber was any better than Moroccan Arabic.  But they didn’t denigrate 
Tashelhit and didn’t seem to have a problem teaching in a bilingual environment.   
One scene from the mosque school in Tagharghist illustrates this point.  I was having 
dinner with the fqih and so waited for him to finish his lessons.  The children had completed 
their religion studies and had had some practice doing long division on a small, much abused 
blackboard.  The fqih gathered the boys and girls around him on a reed mat and waited for 
them to fall silent.  He said very quietly, in colloquial Moroccan Arabic, “What would you 
like today?”  Evidently the children knew the drill well.  The fqih needed only look at a 
student for them to reply with an imaginary item from a grocery store.  If the child gave the 
name of the item in Tashelhit, the teacher would look to another eager face, and then another 
until somebody gave an Arabic name for a product likely to be in a store.  There were no 
beatings or even raised voices.   
This seemed to me a far more effective way than the official government curriculum 
to teach mountain children to survive in Moroccan cities.  Unofficially and without anyone’s 
pedagogical assistance, seated on the traditional reed mat on the roof of a mud walled 
mosque, the fqih illustrated how languages can be taught without being divisive.  He imparted 
useful knowledge without degrading Qur’anic Arabic, Moroccan colloquial Arabic, or 
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Tashelhit.  He taught all three languages in a single day, sometimes in a single lesson.  It 
would seem that the Moroccan government’s attempt to build a Muslim citizenry through 
schools in village mosques works very well.  At least in the mountains people take their 
religion very seriously and nobody I met ever questioned the divine right of the King.  The 
government’s attempt at a more “modern” style education seems less successful, at least 
when applied in a rural, Berber speaking milieu.  In fact, the modern education system in the 
mountains appears destined to generate the very linguistic polarization it would seem 
designed to avoid, one that serves neither the interests of Amazigh cultural activists nor the 
nationalist interest in creating a linguistically homogeneous citizenry.  It certainly doesn’t 
seem to fulfill the needs of the village children.3 
Development 
Arguably education and migration for wage labor are at least linked to what we 
broadly call “development,” and in some sense the three things are part and parcel of the 
same process.  Today, however, there are specific organizations pursuing specific 
“development” objectives in the Agoundis.  The projects launched by these organizations 
articulate with the linguistic situation in the mountains in different ways and to different 
degrees.  There is not space here to develop these directions fully and so I focus only on the 
linguistic element –corruption—in  the interaction of development projects, language, and 
local politics. 
The word “corruption” is almost viscerally unpleasant in English and as such does not 
really capture the way this notion operates in Morocco, especially rural Morocco.  The 
standard modus operandi simply requires the giving of gifts, and though many decry the 
practice everyone understands that this is how things work.  Generally speaking villagers 
only become outraged at what they see as inappropriate exactions, and so what might be 
called “bribery” elsewhere is here more properly considered a complicated negotiation for the 
appropriate price of services rendered.  The problem is that in Berber speaking areas these 
negotiations often occur across a linguistic divide.  Many of the officials are from outside of 
the area and most are monolingual Arabic speakers, or speakers of Arabic and French.  Many 
of these officials are perfectly honest and attempt to do their difficult jobs as best they can.  If 
those below or above a particular person in the hierarchy are operating according to more 
“traditional” and less properly “bureaucratic” paradigms, the job of the “straight” or nishan 
official is made harder still. 
In the Agoundis and elsewhere bureaucratic exactions for various things and services 
are viewed in different ways by different people, and they are not always easy to understand.  
Once, for example, after a visit by a bribe-taking official, one man told me, “only Christians 
are honest.”  Almost in the same breath he also told me that all Arabs were dishonest, which I 
took to mean Arabic speakers since the man who had demanded the bribe spoke only Arabic.  
I assumed this left Tashehit speakers somewhere between Arabs and Christians.  I was 
wrong, however, since when I pressed the question it became clear that what he meant was all 
Muslims were dishonest, a peculiar sentiment given that he himself was Muslim.  In this 
conversation the man I spoke to was conflating Muslim and Arab and opposing this whole 
group to Christians, which he equated with all foreigners.  As a monolingual, devout Muslim, 
Tashelhit speaker the man still considered himself “Arab,” at least in this context.  My point 
is that it’s not easy to comprehend exactly what people mean when they’re upset and one 
thing that greatly upsets poor people is giving their scarce resources to corrupt agents of the 
state.  
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With this caveat in mind, it was the case that many people in Morocco made it very 
clear to me that different government agencies and agents were more or less corrupt.  But 
some country people asserted that the Arabic speaking officials were generally more corrupt 
than the Tashelhit speaking officials.  Objectively we might say that if this is true, it probably 
has more to do with the fact that the Tashelhit speakers are far lower in the graft hierarchy, 
and that they are more likely to live locally and have family in the area.  Relatives are no 
guarantee against opportunism, but the social pressure they exert provides some safeguard.  
As roads and other infrastructure expands, the central government gets more involved in ever 
more remote valleys and more Arabic speakers come in contact with Berber speaking 
citizens.  To the degree that these officials are fair and impartial, there are few problems.  
When officials are not fair, the blame for their avarice at least sometimes falls on their Arab 
ethnicity rather than on their government position or their personal ethical failings.  Rural 
Berber speakers have few or no official channels of complaint, at least channels that they can 
trust.  Their final appeal is to charge greedy officials with being bad Muslims, with operating 
contrary to Islam.  Thus government corruption is an under appreciated fountain of support 
for political Islam in Morocco. 
International development agencies must deal with corruption also, but run into added 
layers of linguistic problems.  The World Bank, for example, is funding a series of programs 
in the Agoundis and other valleys bordering the Toubkal National Park.  The Bank is very 
concerned to insure that as much of their money as possible ends up being spent on the 
projects for which it’s intended.  To this end, one day in 1999 they sent a representative to 
Tagharghist to discuss the terms for disbursement of funds.  The French-speaking 
representative was accompanied by nearly a dozen Moroccan bureaucrats from various 
government agencies.  Most were very well intended.  Most spoke French.  None spoke 
Tashelhit.   
When the two 4x4 trucks pulled up the track the villagers knew something important 
was up.  Children were dispatched to call the men from the fields and they streamed in, 
gathering at the home of the one man in the village who could claim some fluency in Arabic.  
Women from several families were summoned to cook a meal.  Meat and bread and tea were 
scrounged from various households and an impromptu feast was organized the likes of which 
local people would only eat once a year, on the ‘Aid al-Adha.  The food was not for the local 
people, of course, but for the visitors. 
The host of the meeting and presumed translator had gained his knowledge of Arabic 
only by listening to the radio and studying the Qur’an.  As a landed, politically powerful 
patriarch he had not spent time in the cities since he had no need to work there.  The men 
who had spent time working among Arabic speakers and might have some chance of 
translating were not there, of course, precisely because they were off working.  Thus the 
people most technically qualified to mediate between the illiterate Tashelhit speaking 
villagers and the highly bureaucratized and French speaking World Bank were unavailable, 
partially at least because the villagers were given no advance notice of the visit.  Had they 
been given notice, it may not have mattered.  Men sent to the cities are typically the sons of 
more powerful patriarchs.  Their ability to speak at formal occasions would likely be limited. 
What ensued was somewhat farcical.  French sentences that began as something like, 
“we require transparent accounting” were rendered into Moroccan Arabic by the coterie of 
officials and then into Tashelhit by the villager hosting the group.  Such sentences emerged 
from the end of the translation chain sounding something like “do you want money?”  The 
answer, not surprisingly, was yes.   Later, few of the men in attendance told me they 
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understood very much at all.  Most said they understood nothing beyond the fact that they 
were not supposed to steal the money promised for various projects. 
The big and controversial question centered on whether the villagers wanted the 
money disbursed directly to them or whether it should be handled by an intermediate 
government agency.  Both the Bank representative and the villagers knew that the Moroccan 
agency in question would skim some portion of the funds.  The Bank was frustrated, 
therefore, that the villagers decided to let this agency deal with the funds.  The representative 
from the Bank labored (in French) to explain the advantages of getting the money directly, 
and he seemed to think the villagers rather stupid for letting an intermediate agency into the 
mix.  The villagers were not stupid at all.  They knew that they would have to pay out a 
portion of the funds one way or another.  They were afraid that if they got the money first 
they would have to pay the officials anyway and still be accountable to the Bank for all the 
money.  They might end up in trouble with this Bank, a powerful agency they could not 
control or quite comprehend.  From their perspective it made far more sense to just take what 
the agency in question did not skim and thereby avoid any question of impropriety on their 
part.   
Language matters here in simple terms of comprehension, but also in the sense that 
people who can claim that comprehension are in a powerful position.  The man who hosted 
the gathering was not keen to take control of this stage of the deal and ask for the money 
directly.  It is a safe bet, however, that he will have much to say about what to do with 
whatever money finally filters down.  When local decisions have to be made about which 
canals to be improved or where to build a cement water storage cistern, the host will have 
significant influence.  He managed to present a plausible claim that he had the linguistic 
resources necessary to lead the villagers in a rapidly changing political climate. 
Conclusion 
Increasingly the social and political ambit of Tashelhit speaking mountain farmers 
includes Arabic speaking schoolteachers and government officials, French, German, and 
English speaking development agents, and rising numbers of circulating migrant workers.  
This expanding movement and interaction generates a real and increasing cognizance in the 
mountains that life without electricity, adequate medical care, or sanitation facilities is less 
than wholly adequate.  Such social changes have also served to foreground what long 
remained a centrally invisible fact about these Moroccan farmers: they’re Imazighen, 
Berbers.  They don’t speak the national language.  With religious, social and economic unrest 
dominating the news in and on Morocco, cultural politics have gone relatively unnoticed.  
Within the realm of cultural politics, developments in the countryside are perhaps the most 
difficult to ascertain.  Aided by new communications media, urban Amazigh activists have 
managed to articulate a sense of cultural identity as Imazighen, but in the countryside there 
are no demonstrations and no press releases, no Internet discussion groups, magazines or 
newsletters.  In much of the mountains radio reception is patchy and illiteracy is almost total.  
Still, here too there are shifts in how Berber speakers see themselves and their world and 
these shifts in perception articulate with larger processes of migration, educational policies 
and development projects.  As Micaela di Leonardo has written, “The real key to the 
perception of cultural difference is politics.”4   It remains to be seen how these changes in 
cultural perception in the middle of nowhere will play out on the main stage of Moroccan 
politics.  Surely they will have a role. 
In terms of anthropology, our knowledge of such communities will also have a role.  
Gone are the days when we can describe “tribal” social organization as if the Moroccan state 
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did not exist, as if the production of social ties was unaffected by broader relations of 
production, signification and power.  Gone are the days when we can imagine society or 
culture as elegant manifestations borne by unconscious agents.  All anthropology is 
anthropology of change, the questions are now what or whom is changing what, how they are 
doing so, and whether it is to be celebrated, resisted or simply described.  It is necessary and 
desirable to continue our academic job as the collectors of on-the-ground facts in out-of-the-
way places so that such questions can be intelligently addressed.  This is in no way 
incompatible with placing such facts in dynamic theoretical frameworks, or working with our 
colleagues in the middle of various nowheres to put such facts and theories to work –
particularly, in my view, for the disempowered.   
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